2011] THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR ALIEN TORTS
Violations of jus cogens norms are considered to be particularly heinous crimes that, by virtue of their commission, impact all states. While customary international law is determined by opinio juris (general agreement by states to be legally bound by such custom) and widespread state practice, 25 jus cogens norms have the highest and most significant status under international law. This status has been seen by some commentators as implicating universal jurisdiction by all states and imposing a duty on all states to prosecute or extradite perpetrators. Because " [t] he TVPA, like the ATCA, furthers the protection of human rights . .. and employs a similar mechanism for carrying out these goals:
civil actions."" The court concluded, "All these factors point towards borrowing the TVPA's statute of limitations for the ATCA." 3 4 It has been commented that " [t] he decision in Papa should serve as the basis to harmonize the limitations period to be used in ATCA actions and has the potential to bring to an end the inconsistent decisions as to the applicable (H.L.) 147, 174 (appeal taken from Eng. time period." 3 5 However, there are several problems with this view. First, while the TVPA, enacted in 1991, has all too often been referenced interchangeably with the ATS, 36 it is in fact a federal statute governed by U.S. federal law 37 rather than the international law invoked in the 1789 Judiciary Act. The TVPA does provide for civil remedies against individuals who commit acts of torture or extrajudicial killing, 3 8 but that is where the similarities between the TVPA 9 and the ATS 4 0 end. The TVPA is narrowly applicable to individuals acting with official authority conferred by a foreign nation. 4 ' The TVPA also makes no reference to international law or the "law of nations." 42 The ATS, 43 on the other hand, is applicable to individuals (and potentially corporations, pending an appeal of Kiobel") who commit any of several atrocity crimes as defined above, whether in private or official capacities. 45 Moreover, the ATS specifically refers to the "law of nations" as the applicable law, 4 6 a reference thoroughly embraced and analyzed by the Kiobel court in its determination regarding corporate liability. 47 Judge Cabranes noted that the Second Circuit had previously looked to customary international law to determine questions of jurisdiction under the ATS. 48 Therefore, the court reasoned, it must continue to examine jurisdictional issues under the ATS 4 9 through the lens of international law. It is inappropriate to impose an identical time limitation for ATS and TVPA violations, which are not governed by the same law, merely because the two statutes can be associated by subject matter.
Rather No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law Referring back to Sosa court's statement that the rule of international law must be "specific, universal, and obligatory," 7 this statement is hard evidence that by 1998, customary international law did not allow statutes of limitation to be applied to the most serious crimes under international law.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
Next, it is important to examine the pronouncements of all relevant international treaties and conventions and analyze state adherence to such agreements as proof of force. The first express pronouncement of the principle of non-prescription for atrocity crimes occurred over forty years ago in the 1968 United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes (U.N. Convention).
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The U.N. Convention, which came on the heels of the Nuremberg trials, 7 s recalled numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council that affirmed the "principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at [Nuremberg]" and noted that "none of the solemn declarations, instruments or conventions relating to the prosecution and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity made provision for a period of limitation." 7 6 The U.N. Convention further noted that applying a statute of limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity prevents the "prosecution and punishment" of perpetrators, finally stating unequivocally that "it is necessary and timely to affirm in international law, through this Convention, the principle that there is no period of limitation for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to secure its universal application."
Despite the fact that the United States is not party to the U.N. Convention, there were many other nations at the time of promulgation that [Vol. 21:2 believed that "the principle of the non-applicability of statutes of limitation to war crimes had already been recognized in international law." 7 This principle was based on the notion that "[w]ar crimes and crimes against humanity can in no way be equated with crimes under municipal law." 79 Even more compelling is the fact that Articles 1(a) and (b) of the U.N. Convention prohibits the imposition of a statute of limitations on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, as defined by the four Geneva Conventions 0 and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." The United States has signed and ratified all of these instruments, 82 which, in the style of the Nuremberg Charter, 83 do not contain a statute of limitations. Several commentators have argued that the U.N. Convention is to be read in conjunction with those treaties and as formally establishing the imprescriptibility of the crimes contained therein. 84 For instance, Chile, which has not ratified the U.N. Convention, 8 ' has concluded that the U.N. Convention has declaratory rather than constitutive effect. The U.N. Convention, sparsely ratified due to its retroactive applicability and lack of clarity regarding definitions, 87 was followed by the 1974 European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity 8 8 and the 1994 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons. 9 The latter convention unequivocally adopted the principle of imprescriptibility, but applied the principal to offenses committed after its passage. The prohibition against torture, also widely acknowledged to have entered the realm of customary international law, 90 
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).
137. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) Taking of hostages; (c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.").
138. explicitly deny a time limitation for prosecuting atrocity crimes. The
Genocide Accountability Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 1091, which has been part of the United States Code since 1987, and states in part (f) that "in the case of an offense under this section, an indictment may be found, or information instituted, at any time without limitation.,, 43 The exact same language can be found in part (d) of the proposed Crimes Against Humanity Act.' Similarly, the Patriot Act states that there is no statute of limitations for certain acts of terror,1 4 5 which, under international law, have been considered crimes against humanity. 146 It should be pointed out that all of these examples involve criminal law, rather than the civil jurisdiction conferred by the ATS.1 47 However, civil jurisdiction under the ATS has always been based on criminal acts,1 48 an inherent duality of the ATS. Originally conceived to address the "three specific offenses against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of England [and identified by Blackstone],"l 49 the Sosaso court widened the jurisdiction, as previously discussed, to include acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
No other country in the world has a statute conferring civil jurisdiction for criminal acts; however, that is precisely the reason the United States should look to comparable domestic criminal codes, which confer jurisdiction for the same acts, for guidance on the question of a statute of limitations. The Kiobel court, in its exhaustive reasoning, cited only international criminal tribunals in determining the scope of ATS civil jurisdiction. The realization of this principle should not depend on whether a remedy is civil or criminal. Both civil and criminal remedies are punitive to current perpetrators and aim to deter future perpetrators. In particular, within the ATS,ss the acts under discussion are of such severity that the fact that the United States offers both remedies should be a source of pride rather than unease. 
VI. WORKS OF PUBLICISTS
The Kiobel court noted that the works of publicists (well-known legal scholars) are relevant sources for determining customary international law when they are used as "trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." 159 Trusted international legal scholars have demonstrated that there is no statutory limitation for atrocity crimes under customary international law. "The non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity has been well recognized in international law since the 76 This requirement ensures that frivolous or inadequately-supported claims (whether brought within five or fifty years of the associated acts) under the ATS'" will be denied in U.S. courts. In the campaign for full enforcement of international human rights standards, it is detrimental to be an alarmist who views the judiciary as a collective pushover rather than as a group of thoughtful jurists who are fully aware of the dangers that they themselves would face if the pleading standards weren't fully applied.
The second complication is the prospect of negative relations with the home countries of defendants in ATS' 78 suits. This complication is an issue that has the potential to emerge in any case involving foreign defendants, whether private individuals, corporations, or sovereigns. The United States has measures in place, including the Act of State doctrine,1 7 9 the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,' 80 and opinions of the State Department,1 8 1 to ensure that when court action is a potential threat to foreign relations, the cases are carefully analyzed by the judiciary before being either dismissed (1) while the Court must accept well-pled facts as true, it is not required to adopt a plaintiff's legal conclusions; (2) the mere possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss; well-pled allegations must move a claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible.").
176. The Second Circuit found, however, that "not every case 'touching foreign relations' is non-justiciable and judges should not reflexively invoke these doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions in the context of human rights. We believe a preferable approach is to weigh carefully the relevant considerations on a case-by-case basis."' 8 5
Such judicial discretion must be applicable to all ATS cases in order to ensure that justice in the human rights context is served at all possible times, notwithstanding political threats.
A third, and legitimate, fear is that the right to be tried without undue delay, along with issues of practicality, is compromised by removing the statute of limitations from these core crimes. At least one commentator has noted "[t]hat the threat of civil litigation must come to an end at some stage is a long-established rule of public policy and a practical necessity." However, there is no reason why the concepts of practicality and undue delay (a "reasonable time" requirement) should not be divorced from a statute of limitation. As explained by the commentators on the Rome Statute, [t] here is a fundamental difference between the two categories of time limits . . . . Limitation statutes usually do not allow a judicial assessment of the (seriousness of the) facts and the context of the case and the way it has been processed by the prosecution and the defence. On the contrary, the 'reasonable time' requirement permits a judicial assessment of the case.
188
For example, the 1984 Convention Against Torture, which imposes no statute of limitations, contains provisions disallowing claims that are considered to be "abuses of right."
18 9 Removing the statute of limitations from ATS' 90 claims, therefore, does not prevent a United States judge from analyzing the case and using her/his discretion to dismiss cases not brought by plaintiffs within a reasonable period of time. A "reasonable period" will differ for every ATS' 9 ' case, due to the nature of the claims. In some circumstances it could be possible for victims of international crimes to find their way to the United States and file suit within ten years, but in others it may not. It may also take ten or more years for perpetrators to set foot in the United States, where they may then be sued.1 92 Such fact-specific decisions are better left to the discretion of federal judges when they arise, rather than to the mercy of a hard statute of limitations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A brief disclaimer should be issued here that this analysis does not rely upon the final holding of the Kiobel 9 3 court. The questions asked were different, and the conclusion of that court-that corporations are not subject to liability under the ATSl 9 4 -has been extremely controversial and is now on petition for certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court. What this article posits is that the Kiobel 95 court was correct in its threshold assessment that the applicable law for ATS' 9 6 questions is customary international law.1 97 It is only logical, then, that customary international law, not U.S. federal law (i.e., the TVPA' 9 '), dictate the statute of limitations for the ATS.' 99 
Id.
192. Judge Cassese expounds on this idea, stating that "if the victims of their relatives do not set in motion criminal proceedings, normally this failure is not due to negligence or lack of interest; initiating such proceedings may indeed prove 'psychologically painful, or politically dangerous, or legally impossible'; as for the national authorities failure to prosecute, it may be due to political motivations which the passage of time may sooner or later efface. 
251
customary international law, whether in the form of tribunals, treaties, state practice, or the writings of scholars, does not allow a statute of limitations for acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The United States has embarked upon a renewed campaign to demonstrate and promote human rights standards in the past two years, including membership in the U.N. Human Rights Council and submission of its first Periodic Review on November 5 of 2010. The effort, however, will be incomplete if perpetrators of atrocity crimes are allowed to avoid liability in the United States because of a technicality that minimizes the ability to hold them liable for their actions. To that end, loopholes such as a statute of limitations must be eliminated for these acts-not only in order to comply with international legal standards, but to enable United States courts to lead state-level jurisprudence on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
